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Abstract
Commercial users of modern communications networks have benefited
from a huge progress of the related technologies. However, Public Safety
Networks (PSNs) and devices did not follow the same trend. Very often,
they still rely on voice or low speed data communications, tempting first
responders to use their own private devices when they need to exchange
real-time video or geolocation information. Under this consideration, na-
tional authorities and specialized organizations have recently initiated the
integration of more recent technologies, such as cellular Long Term Evo-
lution (LTE), even though they need further developments to cope with
the harsh usages that safety personnel may face. This report proposes
to move the evolution of these networks towards the recent evolution of
networking technologies started with Software Defined networking (SDN)
and Network Functions Virtualization (NFV). Based on the requirements
derived from a standardized earthquake scenario and a study of the main
improvements brought by this network softwarization, it analyzes how
SDN and NFV can solve part of the issues raised with commercial LTE
and enhance PSN communications. The capabilities of these new tech-
nologies are applied to a list of characteristics required by mission-critical
networks, e.g., rapid deployment, reliability, security or resilience, taking
advantage of features such as the separation between control and data
planes or the simplified dynamic resources management. The resulting
enhancements are then illustrated using example frameworks published
in the literature for Cloud Radio Access Networks, resilient backhaul so-
lution, isolated base stations, SDN-based architecture or Service Function
Chaining.
1 Introduction
Mobile communications and the Internet have revolutionized our ways of life.
They have even merged together with the introduction of the smartphone, which
delivers performances at an order of magnitude beyond comparison with the first
personal computers sold on the market. Computing and digital technologies now
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progress at an meteoric rate towards higher data speed, larger bandwidth, seam-
less mobility or the Internet of Things (IoT). All these new features mandate
improved characteristics of mobile networks, including enhanced flexibility, se-
curity or scalability. A recent and growing trend in network management and
control aims at meeting these new requirements by the introduction of Software
Defined Network (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) technolo-
gies. Their objective is to bring to the networks the software flexibility and
scalability that will allow them to better fulfill the upcoming needs of network
operators and their users.
However, some of the mobile communications users that would most need
these new technologies still stay behind, namely the Public Safety Networks
(PSNs) users. When the LTE and 4G deployment base grows at a fast pace,
PSN users still depend on 2G data communications, when not restricted to voice.
Until recently, the digitalization of their Professional Mobile Radio (PMR) was
led by a few major projects such as Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) or
Project 25 [6]. TETRA has been deployed in Europe, Middle East, Asia and
Latin America since 1995. It provides mostly voice and dispatch services to
mobile terminals operating in direct mode (DMO), trunk mode (TMO) through
a dedicated infrastructure, or by using neighbour terminals as relays. Data ser-
vices are also available, but at very low speed, from 80 kbps up to potentially
500 kbps [11], using TETRA Release 2 also known as TETRA Enhanced Data
Service (TEDS). The wide geographical coverage enabled by the usage of low
frequency bands permits one to deploy an infrastructure with a reduced number
of base stations. On its side, the collaborative Project 25, or P25, standard-
izes an equivalent system for Land Mobile Radio (LMR), mainly deployed in
Northern America, Australia and New Zealand. The latest version defines data
services at a low level of data rates similar to TEDS.
PSNs carry a mission critical objective, with human lives depending on the
successful exchange of information such as devices location, dispatch services or
alert messages. Fire brigades or police departments are organized in highly mo-
bile groups of individuals respecting a strong hierarchical configuration, which
necessitates different levels of priorities and end-to-end security. They may work
in very harsh environments such as earthquake destruction, fires or flooding and
are expected to provide relief under any circumstances and in any location. Be-
yond the voice and specific services that they receive from their rugged mobile
devices, PSN users tend to start taking advantage of more evolved and powerful
applications, such as real-time video, temperature or heart-rate sensing from
their private commercial smartphones.
Under the consideration that even teenagers own a device much more pow-
erful than first responders, several countries and specialized organizations have
launched the definition or funding of the evolution of the PSN. Their objective is
to integrate the latest advances of mobile communications and offer technologies
at a level equivalent to public commercial networks to their users. In the UK, the
Emergency Service Network (ESN) will start its deployment in 2016, targeting
police, firefighters and ambulances [19]. In the US, the FirstNet authority [10]
plans the establishment of one single inter-operable, highly reliable and resilient
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wireless broadband network to serve police, firefighters, paramedics, and com-
mand centers. The TETRA and Critical Communications Association (TCCA)
has recently selected LTE (Long Term Evolution) as the technology to com-
plement TETRA for broadband communications. Enhancements to LTE and
LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) have been designed and standardized under Release 12
of the 3GPP, as described in [6] to cope with the additional features necessary
to support the PSN operations, such as those described in Section 2.1. At the
same time, various new technologies aiming to enhance the performance and
efficiency of digital communication networks have sprung up in the past years.
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is presented in Section 2.2. It introduces a
clear decomposition of control and data plane, which permits one to perform the
forwarding at flow level according to fine-grained rules. This section also intro-
duces Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) and Service Function Chaining
that complement SDN by adding further flexibility and increasing scalability.
Hence it is a natural tendency to propose the benefits of these new technologies
to the design of future PSNs, as shown in Section 3. In Section 3.1, we ana-
lyze what are the features required for the PSN scenarios. Section 3.2 presents
the C-RAN technology, which introduces flexibility on the fronthaul network.
A set of solutions based on virtualization is sketched in Section 3.3. They ad-
dress the resiliency of the backhaul network and enable the operation of isolated
cells. In Section 3.4, SDN-based frameworks are presented, where the dynamic
management of flows enables improved flexibility for the PSN services. Finally,
Section 4 concludes this study.
2 Background
2.1 Public Safety Networks
2.1.1 An emergency scenario: the earthquake
Public Safety (PS) agencies must accommodate a very large range of events,
which can be classified into two categories. A first category of events requires
mainly prevention. The PS users must ensure the safety of the community dur-
ing big events like sports or festivals. A main characteristic of this category of
events is that it is usually planned well in advance and the technical staffs have
sufficient time to anticipate and extend, or re-organize the communication net-
work as required by the event. The second category of events requires healing
to respond and restore a viable situation after a natural disaster or a criminal
event has occurred. Earthquakes, major storms, bombing and mass transport
accidents fall into this category. Contrary to the first category, the latter events
are unplanned. They may even witness the destruction of the existing infras-
tructure, drastically reducing the means of communications for first responders
and for the public citizens in general, at a time when they have to deal with
emergency requirements.
A typical event of the second category is the earthquake, which scenario
has been described in [8] and is pictured in Figure 1. In order to remain as
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Figure 1: Illustration of the earthquake scenario.
comprehensive as possible, this scenario pictures the event in two sub-areas, a
residential neighbourhood and an industrial estate. The residential neighbour-
hood is composed of apartment buildings as well as individual houses, schools
and stores including a petrol station. The earthquake brings down the school
and a few other buildings, starts a fire in one of the shops in the commercial cen-
ter, threatening to spread to other stores and, even worse, to the petrol station.
A lot of people get trapped under the buildings, in varying conditions, while
others who could escape run away from the danger into the streets. Globally, a
large part of the buildings show a high risk of collapsing. The telecommunica-
tions network is partly destroyed, creating large coverage holes in the area. The
industrial estate contains mainly factory buildings hosting a large number of
employees, a bus garage and a gas tank. The area can be accessed only through
two roads, one large and a second narrow one spanning a river on a small old
bridge. Here as well, the shock brings down the factory buildings, trapping the
employees inside. Moreover, it sets a fire in the bus garage, triggers a landslide
that closes the main access road and breaks the utility infrastructure for water,
electricity and telecommunications. Some cracks can be observed on the small
old bridge, which restricts the access through the narrow road only to light
vehicles.
Very rapidly, the emergency call centers receive a large number of messages
requesting help and inform the first-aid teams and local authorities. The event
brings into the affected area an increasing number of actors. In the first minutes
after the quake strikes, firefighters, Search and Rescue (SAR) teams, medical
services and police units arrive on scene to secure the hazard area, i.e., the area
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that was most struck and where individuals may be endangered, as well as a
larger and safer zone around it, where most of the first responder teams can be
installed, the incident area. They prevent unauthorized access and start their
relief operation. An emergency Casualty Collection Point (CCP) is established
to receive and triage the victims according to their condition. Rapidly, the whole
site gets organized under the governance of a hierarchical management struc-
ture of Emergency Control Centers (ECC) receiving instructions and reporting
to an off-site Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA). Other off-site
services, e.g., ambulance stations, fire stations, hospitals, shelters such as sports
hall belonging to local authorities call up their staff for on-site or remote assis-
tance. The different teams are dispatched in the incident and the hazard areas
by their relevant ECC. Relief locations, with temporary shelters and medical
equipment are settled in the incident area to receive the victims, care for them
according to their conditions and bring them suitably out of the incident area,
where they will be further treated or released. Until the last patient has been
helped, the SAR teams keep moving between the hazard areas and the relief lo-
cations. Additional firefighter teams try to reach the scene, but their big trucks
are blocked at the obstructed accesses, delaying the resolution of the fires. Tech-
nical experts start assessing the level of the damages to the infrastructure. Road
department experts evaluate the stability of the old bridge, exchanging pictures
with remote engineers. Construction companies begin evacuation of the mud
on the main access road to restore the vehicle traffic flow, assisted by defense
forces, under the remote and local direction of geologists. Power, water and
food supply are gradually restored by local utility companies and authorities.
Repair teams start installing an emergency communication network to compen-
sate for the destroyed infrastructure, after which they tackle the restoration of
the original telecommunications networks.
All along, lightly affected and off-site citizens try to contact their relatives
to learn whether they have been affected or not, have been moved to hospi-
tals, to shelters or to other places. The media try to exchange information
with their headquarters, sending reports for the news magazines and TV shows.
Both types of users can only rely on the possible usage of the remnants of the
telecommunications infrastructure that are still available, and as soon as they
are operational, on the authorized parts of the restored networks.
2.1.2 Requirements
The scenario presented in the previous paragraph, which shows a worst case
event, allows deriving the main requirements for future PSNs.
In a first step, it shows the large diversity of actors and other citizens that
have to be accommodated by the networks, as well as their needs. Today, the
existing PS communications rely mainly on voice conversations, but real-time
pictures, video, access to databases, geolocation, purpose-made PS applications
could highly improve the impact and efficiency of the rescue missions. Secondly,
the scenario also demonstrates that the different groups require different types
of communications. The rescue personnel is linked through group communica-
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tions to their teammates and dispatching commandments, because they keep
sharing real-time information. In existing networks, they use a push-to-talk
broadcast mechanism, providing mainly group voice communications. Only one
device transmits at one time and all the others listen, based on priority, e.g.,
the dispatcher’s device has a higher priority. The devices are hardened against
external conditions, such as high temperature, and are very easy to use, even
with heavy protective gloves [11], which are not part of the common features
of commercial smartphones. The PS communications must be restricted to a
specific geographical area, covering the hazard area where the teams operate.
From the ECC point of view, reporting upwards in the hierarchy or requesting
information from the local control center rather requires one-to-one communi-
cations. These communications must be granted a high priority level in the
network, either by owning a guaranteed and private spectrum, or by enforcing
QoS mechanisms that increase their priority compared to commercial users in
the case where the network is shared. Even more, emergency PS users ought to
have higher priority than regular PS users.
[19] gives the different levels of deployment options for future PSNs, espe-
cially when taking into account the sharing of the mobile broadband (MBB)
network. It ranges from a separate private PSN, to RAN sharing, to consider-
ing the PSN as a prioritized virtual operator network or as an overlay over the
commercial MBB network. It also considers the possibility for the PS devices to
roam to any available MBB network, while operating at a higher priority level
when this is made relevant due to external conditions. Roaming also allows to
benefit from heterogeneous services such as Wi-Fi or satellite access when they
are available, either because they were not destroyed or because they could be
established as a temporary emergency solution. The cost for such solutions
varies in a wide range. Using a dedicated allocated frequency spectrum with
specific devices does not allow taking advantage of scalability savings, as could
be the case with devices operating in commercial frequency bands. The network
deployment must be flexible enough to easily accommodate any or a mix of the
previous options.
These deployment options introduce three major requirements on future
PSNs: (1) full geographical coverage, potentially through heterogeneous ac-
cesses; (2) robustness and reliability of the network to avoid losing the connec-
tion at a critical time; and (3) resilience provided by pooling, back-up connec-
tions, traffic load balancing or automated management tools. The full coverage
and the resilience may also be achieved using technologies that allow deploy-
ing rapidly extensions to the existing and still usable infrastructure, e.g. by
pre-installed cells in emergency vehicles. When the full coverage is not feasible
because of the failing infrastructure, the mobile devices must be able to interact
directly with one another or to serve as relays or gateways to neighbour devices.
This is known as Device-to-Device (D2D) communications. With the objective
to guarantee communications between the incident area and the off-site loca-
tions, the PSN must take into account the large geographical distribution of
devices and external server locations. Accordingly, the network planning must
be flexible and scalable to accommodate a rapid increase of the number of PS
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actors brought on-site in the incident area and able to cope with the high mo-
bility of teams such as SAR, which permanently move back and forth between
the hazard area and the ECC, or of the ambulances that transport casualties to
the off-site hospitals.
The security of the network, from a physical or cyber point of view, is of
extreme importance. Network peripherals and data centers must not be brought
down easily after their installation. Capability to access the network must be
restricted both at device and at user level. All the traffic must be protected,
whether it relates to the management, control or user plane of communications.
The confidentiality of each transaction and conversation must be preserved,
either inside each team or between a local ECC and the off-site LEMA, with
the possibility to separate the different PS teams and agencies inside the PSN.
2.2 Network Softwarization
Networks today became so complex that it was necessary to rethink the
way they were conceived to provide higher level of abstraction to increase their
efficiency (e.g., cost, energy) and simplify their management. To that aim,
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [20, 25, 16] has been proposed. SDN ad-
vocates a clear separation between the data-plane, composed of the various
forwarding devices, and the control-plane implementing the network control
logic. This principle of separation is not so novel but was hardly reachable
so-far because of technical limitations. However, nowadays with the generaliza-
tion of virtualization and the potentially high performance that can be reached
by commodity hardware, it is possible to implement efficiently the separation
between the control and the data planes.
The general idea of SDN is illustrated in Fig. 2. The separation between
the control and the data planes is realized by a Southbound API while the
network logic is implemented by a logically centralized Controller Platform to
which network applications interact by the means of a Northbound API. The
controller platform manages the state of forwarding elements (e.g., switches
and routers) directly with the southbound interface. This approach reduces the
complexity of forwarding elements as their only role is to forward data packets
in the network.
OpenFlow [18] is by far the most mature implementation of the southbound
interface [20, 25, 16, 14, 15]. Interestingly, OpenFlow started in the academia
but rapidly received much attention from the industry such that nowadays, all
major vendors support OpenFlow in their commercial products [20]. The project
became so important that the Open Network Foundation (ONF) [12] driven by
the most influential actors of the Internet (e.g., Google, Facebook, Microsoft,
Cisco) has been created to design, improve, and maintain the OpenFlow protocol
and its satellite components.
While usually forwarding decisions are taken on a per destination basis, in
OpenFlow all forwarding decisions are performed on a flow basis. This approach
permits a fine-grain granularity in the way traffic is managed within the net-
work. An OpenFlow switch consists of flow tables, each containing a prioritized
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2 Chapter 1. Introduction
Controller Platform
Network applications
Southbound API (e.g. 
OpenFlow)
Northbound API
Data forwarding elements (e.g. OpenFlow switches)
Figure 1.1: SDN architecture
The key to simplify network management is raising the level of network abstrac-
tion. Higher abstraction hides the complexity of underlying networks, and helps
operators to manage the network in an e cient, less error prone way. To that goal,
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [NMN+14, XWF+14, KRV+14], an emerging
network architecture that advocates the separation between forwarding devices (the
data plane) and the network control logic (the control plane), is proposed. SDN
is not an entire new thing, but it appears at the intersection of ideas, technology
maturity and future needs.
Fig. 1.1 shows the SDN architecture. The separation of the control plane and the
data plane is realized by a well-defined southbound application programming interface
(API). In SDN, network control logic is implemented in a logically centralized entity,
called the controller. The controller is logical centralized but can be physically
distributed for scalability reason. Also, a switch may have multiple controllers. Via
the southbound API, the controller directly manages the state of forwarding devices
to respond to a wide range of network events, for example, a link is congested.
Furthermore, the controller also exposes high level northbound APIs for operators
to write network applications to automate management tasks, such as firewall, load
balancing. With this architecture, SDN promises to dramatically reduce costs and to
simplify network management thanks to commodity, vendor-independent forwarding
hardwares and high level interfaces for management.
OpenFlow [MAB+08a], depicted in Fig. 1.2, is the most popular implementa-
tion of the southbound interface of SDN [NMN+14, XWF+14, KRV+14, JKM+13,
KSP+14]. Although OpenFlow started as academic experiments, it is receiving much
attention from both academic and industry. Many vendors have supported Open-
Flow in their commercial products [NMN+14]. Open Network Foundation [OTW13],
an industrial-driven organization including the biggest operators such as Google,
Facebook, Yahoo, Microsoft, is promoting OpenFlow as the standard southbound
API. The latest version of OpenFlow is 1.5 [of1].
Figure 2: Generic architecture of a SDN network.
list of rules that determine how packets have to be processed by the switch.
Conceptually, a rule is composed of three components: a matching pattern,
an actions field, and counters. The matching pattern forms a predicate whose
value is computed on-the-fly by the switch based on packet meta-information
(e.g., source IP address, destination port, VLAN tag). All packets making true
the matching pattern predicate are said to belong to the same flow. The ac-
tions specified in the actions field of the rule are applied to every packet of the
corresponding flow. The most common actions are: forwarding, dropping, or
rewriting the packets. Finally, the counters are us d to keep statistics on the
flows. As a packet may match multiple matching patterns, each rule is associ-
ated with a priority and only the rule with the highest priority that matches the
packet is considered to take actions on it. The prioritization of rules permits
constructing multiple levels of granularity. Fig. 3 summarizes the architecture
of OpenFlow and the i eractions between the various network components.
In operation, when an OpenFlow switch receives a packet, it checks its flow
tables. If the packet matches no rule, the switch may send a request to the
controller to determine what actions to perform on the packet. The switch
then stores the information so it can process packets accordingly for any further
packet belonging to the same flow as the initial packet.
SDN allows to separ te data-plane and control-plane components by the
means of abstractions such as OpenFlow. How ver, with the generalization of
software solutions in networking, it is possible to complement this abstraction
with the virtualization of the network functions themselves. This approach
known as Network Function Virtualization or NFV relies on the fact that net-
work functions can be implemented in software and thus be virtualized and
operated on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) machin s. A direct benefit of this
approach is in the costs reduction. However, as functions are virtualized and run
on virtual machines, it also results in more flexibility and scalability as virtual
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1.1. Problem Statement 3
Forward to port A
Modify header fields
Drop
IP src/dst , port 
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MATCHING ACTIONS COUNTERS
OPENFLOW 
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CONTROLLER
APPLICATION
Northbound API
OpenFlow Protocol
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Firewall Learning Switch
Load 
Balancing
Topology 
Manager
Device 
Manager Statistics
Figure 1.2: OpenFlow Architecture
Basically, forwarding devices are called OpenFlow switches and all forwarding
decisions are flow-based instead of destination-based like in traditional routers. An
OpenFlow switch consists of flow tables, each containing a prioritized list of rules
that determine how packets have to be processed by the switch.1 A rule consists of
three main components: a matching pattern, an actions field and a counter. The
matching pattern forms a predicate whose value is computed on-the-fly by the
switch based on packet meta-information (e.g., source IP address). All packets
making true the matching pattern predicate are said to belong to the same flow.
The actions specified in the actions field of the rule are applied to every packet of
the corresponding flow. The most common actions are: forwarding, dropping, or
rewriting the packets. Finally, the counter is used to count the number of packets
that has been processed (i.e., that made the predicate hold true) along with the
lifetime of this rule. As a packet may match multiple matching patterns, each rule is
associated with a priority and only the rule with the highest priority that matches
the packet is considered to take actions on it. The prioritization of rules permits
constructing default actions that can be applied on packets only if no other rule can
be used. Examples of default actions are dropping packets, forwarding packets to a
default interface, or even to the controller. For e ciency and flexibility reasons, the
latest versions of OpenFlow [of1] support pipeline processing where a packet might
be processed by several rules from di erent flow tables.
The behavior of OpenFlow switches strongly depends on the set of rules it
holds. Many network applications can implemented from OpenFlow, for example,
monitoring, accounting, tra c shaping, routing, access control and load balanc-
ing [MAB+08a]. To implement these applications and operators policies, it is
important to select a set of corresponding rules to be installed each OpenFlow
switches, called rules placement solutions. An ine cient rules placement may lead to
frequently flow table miss, high signaling overhead, high setup delay, that degrades
1We follow the OpenFlow model terminology where a packet consists of any piece of information
traveling through the network and a switch stands for any device processing such a packet.
Figure 3: OpenFlow architec ure.
machines can be migrated at anytime or hardware can be upgraded without
interrupting operations. When network functions are virtualized and SDN is
used, then Service Fu ction Chaining (SFC) is straightforward. SFC consists
in linking network functions to produce services. As every component is oft-
ware and virtualized, service chains can be modified at anytime to provide new
services or to adapt to the load.
3 How c n SDN and NFV improv SN commu-
nications
3.1 Required features for PSN s enarios
By their very nature, Public Safety Networks are challenging as they are
suppos d to work properly even in chao ic situations such that priority man-
agement, fault tolerance, and rapidity of deployment are the key features to
implement in order to build PSN solutions. The generalization of the software
approach in networking with SDN, NFV, and SFC permits to design the new
generation of PSNs in an elegant way and sections below show examples of so-
lutions leveraging it. OpenFlow is a key technology to enable efficient priority
management. Indeed, in OpenFlow netw rk decisions are decide on a flow
basis, for arbitrary flow definition, and implemented in the form of rules with
priority levels. It thus means that flows can be treated differently based on poli-
cies implemented by the controller and as the controller has a full view of the
network, it ensures the strict respect of the policies. The centralization of deci-
sions may appear as a weakness of SDN. However, the centralization of decisions
avoids tra sient situations where all network components try to converge to a
new stable state thanks to distributed algorithms, it thus avoids inconsistencies
and potential transient loops. The centralization also simplifies fault diagnosis
and recovery. In addition, with the virtualization of network functions, it is
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straightforward to migrate network functions on different pieces of hardware in
case of fault of the underlay. Nevertheless to benefit from all that, it is necessary
to build logically centralized control planes that keep the good centralization
properties without impairing the robustness of the entire system, as shown in
the sections that follow. Finally, the usage of virtual functions and SDN allows
rapid deployment of PSNs as functions can be configured and updated on the
fly without any particular intervention on the device itself.
3.2 Cloud Radio Access Networks (C-RAN)
In current mobile communication networks, Baseband units (BBUs) are usu-
ally co-located with the cell towers on-site. They run on proprietary hardware
and are designed for worst-case peak loads. However, through NFV, BBUs can
be virtualized and run on general purpose computers. Such centralized virtual
BBUs clusters can be provisioned on demand and represent a good replacement
for on-site installations of BBUs in distributed geographical locations. This new
mobile network architecture, called Cloud1 Radio Access Network (C-RAN), can
bring many advantages in a PSN context. The first, an antenna-integrated Re-
mote Radio Head (RRH) is easy to deploy close to an affected area. Second,
a higher system capacity and lower power consumption can be achieved when
installing RRHs close to the rescue teams since the wireless signal will propa-
gate on a short distance to reach them. Third, smart cooperative multiple-radio
resource management can be used (and higher bandwidth) as the baseband pro-
cessing is centralized in a data center (BBU pool), as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: CRAN Architecture. Source:[4]
1C-RAN also refers to Centralized-, Cooperative- or Clean- RAN.
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However, C-RAN involves a huge overhead on the fronthaul link because
very high bandwidth is required on the common packet radio interface (CPRI)
between the RRH and the BBU pool to transmit In-phase and Quadrature (IQ)
data. For instance, in order to carry a 2x2 MIMO, 20 MHz LTE signal, 2.5
Gbps of bandwidth is needed on the CPRI. At the same time, strict constraints
on latency and jitter have to be fulfilled, in particular, the RTT delay of user
data should be less than 5µs [24], and jitter should be less than 65ns [1]. Sev-
eral transport options are possible for CPRI transport such as Dedicated fiber,
Optical transmission network (OTN), Passive optical network (PON) and Mi-
crowave Radio (MWR). For PSN scenarios, as fiber is likely not to be available,
microwave transport is usually the best option for CPRI, provided that the dis-
tance between RRH and BBU is less than 1 kilometer. Note that MWR can
only support a subset of the CPRI line bit rate options. But with 3:1 compres-
sion of CPRI, it is possible to fronthaul a 2x2 MIMO LTE 3-sector RRH site
under full load over two times 1 Gbps MWR links [17].
3.3 Resilient Backhaul solutions
In case of major emergency situations, Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio
Access Network (E-UTRAN) may become isolated from the core network and
the backhaul access (i.e., the X2 air interface in LTE) has to be rebuilt on the fly.
The 3GPP 22.897 specification [2] describes different public safety scenarios and
the corresponding requirements to maintain basic services to users. Note that
the problem of isolated eNBs is also frequent in moving cells scenarios, where the
connectivity remains limited to only a subset of eNBs that can still communicate
to each other through the remaining part of the backhaul. Recently a few
solutions have been proposed to re-establish the communication among different
network partitions.
In [3], the concept of evolved User Equipments (eUEs) is proposed where
eUEs are used as relays between eNBs and are able to be associated with and
convey trafic from multiple eNBs, making possible backhaul access to moving
cells or core-isolated cells as illustrated in Figure 5. In other words, eUEs play
the role of a virtual MIMO antenna with collaborative transmission, which could
be implemented as a new coordinated multipoint (CoMP) mechanism. In this
way, a virtual overlay wireless mesh can be formed on top of the LTE cellular
topology.
Another solution is proposed in [9] for the scenario where eNBs are in range
of each other. This proposal introduces the concept of enhanced evolved Node
B (e2NB) that leverages the existing LTE air interface to allow communica-
tion between eNBs through a Tx/Rx transmitter, and this, without requiring
modifications of the LTE components and protocols.
As shown in Figure 6, the architecture of e2NB adds to the eNB different
LTE components that makes it still operational in the case it is isolated from the
core network. Examples of components include the Mobile Management Entity
(MME) and the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) components, but also two new
functions: (1) Virtual UEs (vUEs) that are deployed as a service by the e2NB to
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Figure 5: eUE. Source:[3]
establish a connection with some of neighboring e2NBs; and (2) a Coordination
and Orchestration Entity (COE) that handles the inter-e2NB communication
and coordinates with other COEs to establish the network topology and optimize
the network. Furthermore, the COE manages the IP addressing space and
performs mesh routing algorithms.
Note that the COE functionality could be implemented in a software defined
networking (SDN)-based network control plane as well as the CoMP function-
ality [5].
[13] proposes a similar software architecture design to enhance the resilience
of LTE networks and enable the operation of isolated base stations (eNB) to
serve in PSNs. The authors introduce the notion of Hybrid-eNB (HYeNB) that
includes the usual entities of an eNB, collocated with a flexible management en-
tity (FME) handling the main Evolved Packet Core (EPC) functions required
to serve the attaching user equipments (UEs). The HYeNB uses its backhaul
link only to synchronize the UE context with the physical EPC. The virtual
EPC inside the FME is pictured in Figure 7. It is made of a gateway-agent
(GW-A) that manages the user plane functionalities, a Mobility Management
Entity-Agent (MME-A) that manages the control plane functionalities, includ-
ing virtual X2 interfaces and handover procedures, and a D2D-Agent (D2D-A)
that manages the mechanisms to enable D2D communications, as explained
below. A link management unit (LMU) manages the link with the physical
EPC through a single or multi-hop connection. A routing management unit
(RMU) routes the packets in the network and maintains the active path with
the physical EPC. A topology management unit (TMU) optimizes the topology
of a network when it contains several HYeNBs. Moreover, when UEs are not
in the coverage of an HYeNB, the authors propose a device-to-device (D2D)
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Figure 6: e2NB. Source:[9]
communication mechanism where the head of a group of PS users broadcasts a
D-Beacon to create and advertise a D2D network with its neighbouring devices.
As soon as one of the UEs recovers the connectivity to an HYeNB, all resources
allocated to the D2D communications are disabled.
3.4 SDN-based frameworks for PSNs
3.4.1 Network Embedded On-line Disaster (NEOD)
Network Embedded On-line Disaster (NEOD) is a globally deployable SDN-
based network disaster management system that focuses on agility, accuracy,
reliability, and scalability issues. It provides abstraction layers to deploy vendor-
agnostic event detectors and to facilitate dynamic configuration of network poli-
cies. As illustrated in Figure 8, NEOD uses a two-tier architecture: (1) a disaster
event detection and filtering segment embedded in an OpenFlow Switch as an
OpenFlow firmware extension; and (2) a disaster correlation and detector man-
agement segment residing in one or more controllers. The first segment includes
Event Detectors, a Dynamic Event Detector Manager, an Event Publisher, and
the System Event Adaptation Layer. Event Detectors use configured policies to
monitor the disaster events, which are sent by the Event Publisher. In the second
segment, the NEOD manager performs correlation of disaster events to provide
root cause classification and prediction of events that have been considered as
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Figure 7: FME software elements and interfaces. Source:[13]
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Figure 8: NEOD Architecture. Source:[22]
not scalable or impossible to conduct. Three types of NEOD Disaster event
detectors are provided: (1) new flow attack consisting in injecting randomly a
large number of new flows to an OpenFlow switch; (2) interface flapping where
a switch interface has a hardware failure that generates alternately "up" and
"down" events; and (3) Event Storm that can occur in case of multiple sta-
tus changes on a network object that is containment relationship with a large
number of other objects.
3.4.2 Decentralize-SDN (D-SDN)
Decentralize-SDN (D-SDN) [21] is a framework that aims to distribute the
SDN control in presence of multiple administrative authorities. It provides both
physical and logical control distribution through a hierarchy of controllers com-
posed of main controllers and secondary controllers, as illustrated in Figure 9.
To operate, a secondary controller needs first to be activated by a main con-
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Figure 9: SDN control delegation
troller, which includes secure authorization and control delegation mechanisms.
Furthermore, the hierarchical structure of controllers helps in improving control
plane availability and fault tolerance.
D-SDN has been applied to a public safety network scenario such as shown
in Figure 10 to demonstrate how control decentralization can help in deploying
rapidly and in a reliable way emergency communication services.
Figure 10: Broadband scenario for inter-agency communication. Source:[7]
The scenario exhibits different public safety authorities that organize them-
selves for exchanging valuable information regarding an emergency situation.
Secondary controllers are running on agency vehicles and serve as gateways to a
network of the different agency actors including firefighters and police officers.
An agency typically has many decentralized secondary controllers that exchange
messages with other agencies’ secondary controllers. The D-SDN framework is
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Figure 11: Joint SFC control architecture. Adapted from:[23]
used to provide fault tolerance communication mechanisms. In particular, in
such extreme environments, connectivity disruptions are frequent and should
trigger a new controller to take over and manage remaining reachable SDN-
enabled devices. An algorithm is proposed to elect in a secure way another
secondary controller in case the previous one is no more reachable. Such a con-
trol delegation is challenging to perform as the system should maintain flow
consistency and share flow state between controllers in presence of extreme
conditions. Finally, D-SDN provides security mechanisms services which are
particularly important in this context, including secure communication with
authentication between controllers and secure association between switches and
controllers.
3.4.3 UNIFY Service Function Chaining (SFC)
As opposed to ISP or data-center networks that are deployed, operated,
and maintained by network engineers, in some situations PSNs will be de-
ployed and operated by emergency services personal that are not engineers.
It is therefore essential to simplify the usability of the system and the UNIFY
framework offers a first step towards this simplification. The UNIFY common
orchestration framework [23] proposes a joint cloud and resource virtualization
Application Programming Interface (API) to optimize resource management in
multi-technology domains, including legacy technologies. The proof-of-concept
(PoC) pictured in figure 11 supports a recursive orchestration mechanism and
automated dynamic service creation. A network function (NF) in a client vir-
tualization can also be replaced with the inter-connection of several NF sub-
components, chained to perform the initial function objective. The core of the
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framework is the ESCAPE global Orchestrator, designed to meet the require-
ments of the joint SFC control plane. It supports recursive orchestration, the
UNIFY resource abstraction model and can address different technological do-
mains via Controller Adapters. A GUI and Service Layer sits on top of the
northbound interface to the Orchestrator. It revolves around a Service Or-
chestrator, which uses a Service Graph mapper to map the service requests
(bandwidth, delay) defined by the consumers of the UNIFY resource service
into a Virtualizer. The global Orchestrator manages the virtualized resources
and network functions. It passes the service requests to an Abstract Resource
Virtualizer over different NF execution environments through specific domain
adapters via its southbound interface. The lower layer of the PoC demonstrat-
ing the SFC is mainly implemented in the Mininet domain, even though Open-
Flow or a standard Universal Node can also be accommodated. In Mininet,
the YANG component contains the data model of the Virtualizer. A dedicated
local orchestrator identical to the global Orchestrator manages the NFs and
deploys the service chains over the domain resources. It takes advantage of
recursive algorithms over the Virtualizer-Manager interface to benefit from the
NF decomposition.
4 Conclusion
This report presented the evolution of PSNs from voice communications
as defined in TETRA or P25 networks towards the more recent networking
technologies. Starting from the detailed example of an earthquake emergency
scenario, the main requirements of future PSNs could be derived. Fast network
deployment, flexibility in the control of the communication flows for robustness,
reliability, secure resources management, or resilience are the main features that
naturally bring forward the recent softwarization and virtualization of the net-
works, as defined in SDN, NFV or SFC novel technologies. A set of applications
or PSN frameworks that take advantage of these new technologies, either at
node or at system level has been presented, involving the RAN, the backhaul,
and the service layer. They picture how software networks help complying with
the critical requirements of PSNs, benefiting from the clear separation between
data and control plane, the faster convergence of newly installed networks, the
centralization of policy decisions, and the flexibility of reconfiguring network
functions in case of overload or hardware damage. PSNs are currently moving
towards existing technologies to provide their users with capabilities equivalent
to commercial data networks. Softwarization and virtualization will be their
next step.
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